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Policy, Institutional Fragility, and Chinese Outward Foreign Direct 







The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an important policy agenda undertaken by the Chinese 
government. We explore how the BRI – as well as an associated policy, the creation of Chinese 
overseas special economic zones – influences Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI). We 
find that host country institutional fragility positively influences Chinese FDI volumes and that the 
impact of institutional fragility on Chinese inward FDI to the host is amplified in the presence of the 
BRI. Specifically, BRI policy facilitates FDI to countries with weaker rule of law and less government 
accountability. We argue that while the BRI may actively facilitate economic growth (i.e. via 
infrastructure development) and in turn aspects of human development, particularly in less developed 












Until quite recently MNEs from developed market economies were largely responsible for 
driving global FDI flows. The general tenor of policy advice given to less developed countries seeking 
to receive greater FDI volumes, predominantly from developed market economies, was to move their 
economies towards market friendly, rules based, well-governed and highly accountable institutional 
frameworks (World Bank, 1997).  This school of thought is perhaps best captured and most closely 
associated with the now well-known “Washington consensus” view of development policy 
(Williamson, 1993; World Bank, 1993). Under this set of broad guidelines and overarching 
philosophy for policy implementation, host countries have been encouraged to foster sound judicial 
institutions, promote transparency, provide accountability, and safeguard property rights, while 
maintaining macroeconomic stability under small, lean professional bureaucracies. 
With the growth of MNEs from emerging markets, particularly those from China, the 
international investment environment and related policy advice for attracting inward FDI has changed 
considerably (Alon et al., 2018). China has become an essential source of FDI for many developing 
countries, in particular in African and Southeast Asian nations. Chinese MNEs, moreover, are 
sometimes considered different from developed market MNEs (Sutherland et al., 2018). They are 
“latecomers”, for example, looking to catch-up (via technology seeking) with their developed market 
counterparts (Sutherland et al., 2020; Anderson et al., 2015; Anderson & Sutherland, 2015a); they 
may exhibit high levels of state-ownership or involvement (Anderson & Sutherland, 2015b), and 
associated mercantilist investment strategies (Clegg et al., 2018); and, importantly, they may have 
so-called “special” ownership advantages – which allows them to more easily do business in markets 
that are imperfect – i.e. characterized by weak and “fragile” institutions (Buckley et al., 2007; Shi et 
al., 2017). As such, the types of policies required to attract EMNE FDI could well be different to 
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those prescribed by the Washington Consensus. As China has started to emerge as a global economic 
power, an alternative set of policies to the Washington consensus began to emerge – provocatively 
but accurately referred to as the “Beijing consensus” (Huang, 2017; Hlover & Shaibu, 2019).  
Founded upon China’s successful economic development experience over the past four 
decades, the Beijing consensus offers ‘an alternative to the policy toolkit offered to developing 
countries by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the so called “Washington 
Consensus”’ (Yagci, 2016: 2). This policy toolkit is typified by things such as incremental reform, 
innovation and experimentation, export-led growth, and state capitalism (Hlover & Shaibu, 2019; 
Williamson, 2012). The Beijing consensus ‘has begun to remake the whole landscape of international 
development, economics, society and, by extension, politics’ (Yao, 2015: 3). According to 
Williamson (2012), ‘the Beijing consensus basically refers to the Chinese way of doing things’ (p. 
3). 
While some scholars have questioned the efficacy of the Beijing consensus as a sustainable 
economic model (Huang, 2011; Williamson, 2012), host countries are not required to follow a 
prescriptive set of pro-market or political (i.e. democratic) ideologies as a precondition for attracting 
FDI and other associated financial and trade related support measures. The advancement of social 
institutions linked to democratic political values, such as greater transparency, accountability, strong 
and independent judicial systems, functioning independent media, are, therefore, not part of Beijing’s 
economic engagement plan. Rather, Beijing is seemingly content, and indeed at times may prefer, to 
work with what may be considered by Western standards institutionally fragile states. Sometimes 
these countries are controlled by unelected authoritarian leaders. Such leaders, faced with economic 
development needs, have a choice between free market, democratic institutions imposed by Western 
world order on the one hand, and the Beijing model of a quasi-liberal market economy coupled with 
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authoritarianism on the other hand. As a result, despite theoretical arguments that institutional voids 
and political risk will negatively impact FDI, much of the research on Chinese outward FDI to date 
supports the opposite view: Chinese (C)MNE investment significantly increases as institutions 
weaken and political risk levels increase (Buckley et al., 2007; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012).  
The BRI was initiated in 2013 (Duan et al., 2018) and is ‘designed to stimulate economic 
development by dramatically enhancing regional interconnectivity’ (Rolland, 2017: 127). More 
specifically, BRI was ‘devised to reconfigure China’s external sector in order to continue its strong 
growth’ (Huang, 2016: 314). This is done in several ways, such as infrastructure development and 
“connectivity” investments (Swaine, 2015). Past studies found that host country engagement in the 
BRI significantly increases FDI volumes into those countries. More specifically, infrastructure-based 
projects were found to be primarily driven by state-owned firms, while non-infrastructure projects 
are primarily driven by private Chinese firms (Du & Zhang, 2018). In the case of private investment 
in BRI host countries, the development of overseas special economic zones (SEZs) play a particularly 
germane role.  Overseas SEZs are Chinese government funded areas which seek to promote Chinese 
FDI into host countries with a focus on, for example, logistics, export processing, and manufacturing 
(Bräutigam & Tang, 2012). In many cases, Chinese overseas SEZs are created for Chinese MNEs 
exclusively (Bräutigam & Tang, 2014). While these SEZs are not created only in BRI countries, they 
have become an important policy pillar within the BRI structure and strategic approach.  As a policy 
initiative, BRI – and it subcomponents, such as SEZs – is intricately linked to the internationalization 
of Chinese firms. Accordingly, this raises a question: does the BRI increase the attractiveness of host-
countries associated with institutional weakness (which we refer to hereafter as fragility) for CMNE 
related FDI?  
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We contribute to the literature on FDI from China by proposing and testing the impact of 
Chinese policy initiatives on the counter-intuitive relationship found in past articles between 
institutional fragility and Chinese investment. We confirm that Chinese FDI is more strongly attracted 
by weak institutional environments. In addition, we find the BRI policy amplifies (i.e. positively 
moderates) the impact of host country institutional fragility on Chinese FDI volumes. We also find 
evidence that Chinese FDI is sensitive to weaknesses in specific institutional domains in the presence 
of the BRI: it is higher in countries with weaker rule of law and less accountability under the BRI 
policy. We consider why this might be so, focusing on the difficulties of implementing large-scale 
infrastructure projects, an important component of the BRI, in nations with strong legal institutions 
and greater accountability. In addition, we consider how the depth of host country engagement with 
the BRI (proxied by SEZ creation), may amplify (i.e. moderate) the impacts of institutional fragility 
on FDI volume. We do so by exploring the simultaneous engagement of host countries in the BRI as 
well as China’s strategic initiative to create overseas SEZs in FDI recipient host countries. As 
mentioned, Chinese overseas SEZs are an additional component of the BRI and thus creation of an 
SEZ indicates fuller engagement with the BRI by host countries. In such cases we find the moderation 
effects of BRI engagement on institutional fragility to be even greater. Our discussion notes that from 
a host country perspective, approaches for attracting Chinese FDI appear to stand in direct contrast 
to those advocated in Washington consensus style policy toolkits (i.e. promoting sound institutions). 
This is because Chinese FDI is more strongly associated with BRI countries when there is less 
transparency, accountability and weaker rule of law.  
The paper proceeds as follows: we first develop three hypotheses, related to the BRI’s impacts 
on Chinese outward (O)FDI volumes, incorporating the moderating impacts on institutional fragility 
as well as the development of overseas SEZs as representative policies. We then outline our 
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methodological approach using a panel data set on Chinese greenfield and acquisition equity 
investments in host countries world-wide, accounting for potential endogeneity concerns. Finally, we 
discuss our results, highlighting the positive moderation impacts on institutional fragility of the BRI 
initiative and the further amplifying impacts of the accompanying creation of overseas SEZs.  
  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Host country political and diplomatic ties with China and Chinese outward FDI volumes 
That state agencies intervene in the FDI decision of CMNEs, especially state-owned ones, has 
been established by previous research and is well documented (Quer et al., 2012, 2018, 2019, 2020; 
Li & Alon, 2019). The state engages its multinationals both directly (e.g., ownership and control), 
indirectly (e.g., regulation and incentives) and in relation to specific markets (e.g., idiosyncratic 
bilateral and multilateral institutional relationships).   
A number of prior studies have investigated the link between bilateral international 
relationships and inward FDI volumes from China. According to Zhang, Jiang and Zhou (2014), 
bilateral diplomatic activities, such as senior government official visits, increase Chinese FDI, 
especially in resource-rich countries. Quer et al. (2019) report similar findings specifically in visits 
to Latin American countries. Further, it has been found that ties between political actors in different 
countries, through UN voter similarity, for example, increases the likelihood that a Chinese firm will 
establish a foreign subsidiary in that host country (Li et al., 2018). Duanmu (2014) also reports 
somewhat similar findings, but clarifies that the relationship depends on ownership. These papers 
provide a foundation for understanding the relationship between creating and strengthening bilateral 
relationships and increasing levels of Chinese FDI. However, to date this research has largely tested 
this relationship through implicit means (e.g. senior official visits, UN voter similarity).  
7 
 
Our purpose here is to expand this research by testing the influence of more explicit bilateral 
investment policies on Chinese OFDI, specifically the BRI. This policy initiative, created by the 
Chinese government  and consisting of two components (the Silk Road Economic Belt and a 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road (Fei, 2017: 838)), involves ‘the funding and construction of a system of 
roads, railways, oil and natural gas pipelines, fiber-optic and communication systems, ports, and 
airports’ (Lairson, 2018: 40) and deepening economic integration and engagement with China in 
order to create new economic opportunities and assert greater international influence (Huang, 2016). 
It has been referred to as an ‘ambitious $1tn project, stretching from the South Pacific to the fringes 
of Europe and Latin America’ (Weinland, 2019: 18).  Along with being a massive construction project 
to fund and construct infrastructure of all kinds, it aims to further integrate Chinese and participant 
host countries, which covers ‘cooperation in all aspects, from policy dialog to trade, from financial 
cooperation to people-to-people exchange’ (Zhang, et al., 2018: 2). The BRI is intended to be a 
multilateral system of deep interdependence where all participants gain from China’s ‘efforts in 
supplying capital, defining and implementing a system designed to provide mutual growth and 
potentially providing the rules, norms, and institutions to facilitate the operation and management of 
such a system’ (Lairson, 2018: 38).  It has set up, for example, specific international dispute resolution 
mechanisms for BRI related investments (Tao & Zhong, 2018).  Finally, it is important to note that 
policy orientation has also ‘shifted from direct financial assistance to the output of development 
experience….as a sharing of China’s expertise and development success’ (Brautignam & Tang: 812) 
(emphasis added).  
 To date, surprisingly, there are comparatively few studies that have explored the economic 
impacts of the BRI. Perhaps, as Zhai (2018) notes, this is because of some of the challenges in pinning 
it down: ‘the BRI is still a flexible conceptual initiative and far from a well-defined action plan with 
8 
 
top-down design. The vagueness of the BRI program leads to difficulties in quantitatively evaluating 
its economic impact’ (Zhai, 2018: 85). Or, as Hillman (2018) puts it: ‘the BRI label evades 
classification. There is no agreed-upon definition for what qualifies as a BRI project’ (p. 3). Extant 
studies have focused primarily on its potential impacts in facilitating trade flows, particularly between 
Europe and China (i.e. via land routes) and in doing so spurring economic growth (Zhai, 2018; 
Maliszewska & Van Der Mensbrugghe, 2019; Herrero & Xu, 2016; Villafuerte et al., 2016). However, 
as well as improved trading relationships, increased Chinese FDI to host countries would also appear 
an inevitable outcome of the BRI.  There is anecdotal evidence, for example, that those host countries 
involved with the BRI have increased their levels of overall Chinese OFDI. Hillman (2018), for 
example, notes how ‘Chinese outbound capital restrictions appear to be more relaxed for BRI-related 
transactions. Deals that might be classified as advancing the BRI are more likely to be approved, and 
to be approved faster. In contrast, China has been reining in outbound deals for foreign real estate, 
entertainment, and sports teams’ (p. 3). Our purpose, as noted, is to further explore the impacts of the 
BRI on Chinese FDI. 
 
What types of FDI are BRI countries likely to receive? 
China has begun many sizable infrastructure projects throughout the BRI countries, examples 
include $1.73 billion for transport, energy, and communication projects in Central Asia (Indeo, 2018), 
China General Nuclear Power Corporation’s $7.8 billion investment in a Romanian nuclear power 
plant and another $11.1 billion for a special investment fund under the BRI for other Eastern 
European ventures (Vangeli, 2017). Other current infrastructure projects include $1.6 billion Batang 
Toru dam being built on the island of Sumatra, Indonesia, and in Kenya the construction of a $2 
billion coal powered power station (Wilson, 2019). While construction projects may involve the 
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establishment of foreign subsidiaries, often related to very large state-owned construction firms 
(China now has eight of ten largest construction firms in the world (Hillman, 2018)), it is important 
to note such projects are often associated with a range of accompanying private sector initiatives 
(Parente et al., 2019). Initial construction projects, underwritten at first by soft loans, in time also 
provide opportunities for all Chinese firms to learn more about foreign markets, develop networks 
(with local firms and politicians) and thus lead to new market opportunities. Infrastructure, therefore, 
has been found to act as an important initial catalyst for further subsequent FDI of different types 
(Parente et al., 2019). As such, we would expect countries that engage with the BRI to, in general, 
receive higher FDI inflows. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Host country engagement with the BRI is associated with greater volumes of 
FDI from China. 
 
Do formal policy initiatives moderate the impact of institutional fragility? 
Recently, scholars have found that Chinese FDI appears to counter conventional wisdom on 
the relationship between institutional fragility and FDI (Buckley et al., 2018). Institutional 
effectiveness stems from complementarity across three set of political institutions: the state, rule of 
law, and political accountability (Fukuyama, 2014). When these are absent or weak, institutional 
fragility occurs (Shi et al., 2017).1 Countries with high levels of internal institutional friction have, at 
least for developed market MNEs, long been viewed as highly risky for FDI and to be avoided 
(Kobrin, 1979; Brewer, 1981; Alesina & Tabellini, 1989; Howell & Chaddick, 1994; Alon & Martin, 
1998). Yet, a range of cross-sectional and panel studies have found Chinese FDI volumes appear to 
                                                          
1 The concept of institutional fragility Shi et al. (2017) develop is somewhat different from ours. They argue that rather 
than focus on a more static view of institutional change, different dimensions of institutions progress (or regress) at 
different rates, which creates internal friction and conflict during institutional reform. 
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correlate positively with a country’s level of institutional weaknesses (which we also refer to here as 
“institutional fragility”). Buckley et al. (2007), for example, find a positive and significant impact of 
institutional fragility on Chinese FDI. Using political stability, Ramasamy et al. (2012) finds similar 
results. Kolstad and Wiig (2012) find an interaction between institutions and natural resources is 
negative and usually significant, suggesting Chinese natural resource seeking firms invest in weak 
institutional climates. Blomkvist and Drogendijk (2013) concluded that the larger the differences in 
the political systems between China and a potential target market, the less Chinese firms invest in 
that market. They suggest Chinese FDI is attracted to countries that disregard human rights and have 
relatively high political risk profiles. Kang and Jiang (2012) argue Chinese firms prefer to locate in 
risky locations as those locations are similar to their domestic business environment.  
The heft of the Chinese government in backing investments of CMNEs through explicit 
policies, such as the BRI, might create institutional fragility attractiveness for CMNEs. The Chinese 
state, for example, has the ability to critically engage host countries via its policies, which 
subsequently may redefine conventional risks commonly associated with institutional fragility. This 
potentially creates opportunities for CMNEs, as well as a new path for host countries to generate FDI 
from China. One aim of the BRI is to provide an institutional system to facilitate investment and other 
economic activity between BRI countries and China. This structural system of cooperation and 
interdependence through the BRI signals to CMNEs that they have the ability to leverage their 
government’s external policies. This may reduce actual as well as perceptions of risk for Chinese 
MNEs investing in participant countries and thus increase investment, despite the persistence of 
institutional fragility within them.  Indeed, what may be considered a politically risky unattractive 
investment location by a Western developed market MNE, owing to lack of legal structures, 
accountability, corruption, and weak regulatory systems (and no domestic governmental support – 
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rather hindrances – i.e. laws outlawing corrupt practices like bribery), may be perceived as the exact 
opposite by Chinese MNEs. 
Infrastructure related development projects are a significant component of the FDI projects 
undertaken in BRI countries (Hillman, 2018). There are also reasons for thinking that undertaking 
such projects may be easier in institutionally weak environments. The construction of dams, roads, 
ports, power plants and the like may entail complex political consultation processes when undertaken 
in institutionally strong environments. Interest groups, represented by NGOs and civil society 
organizations, must be consulted in institutionally developed settings. Legal restrictions (for example, 
governing environmental standards, safeguarding of biodiversity etc.), moreover, may potentially 
cause long delays or even scupper projects in institutionally developed countries. Legal interventions 
can certainly add uncertainty as to whether some infrastructure projects can be completed. By contrast, 
such infrastructure projects might be more easily negotiated and implemented in weaker institutional 
environments. While the financing channels available to BRI countries are significant (involving, 
among other things, soft loans from Chinese development banks), these cannot be accessed if projects 
cannot be approved. The legal complexity of many such projects means they may be more easily 
initiated and completed in authoritarian regimes where rule of law is mandated, often by dictatorships.  
To illustrate how the BRI may positively moderate the impact of institutional fragility on FDI, 
the case of Chinese investments made by the Queensway Group in Angola (a BRI member) and 
subsequently other developing countries, is instructive. After a 27year civil war (ending in 2002) 
Western donors (such as the IMF) were unwilling to support Angola. China, by contrast, quickly 
developed political ties with Angola, in part owing to it large oil reserves (which China lacks). To 
date, Chinese engagement with Angola has provided more than 60 billion US dollars in loans for 
infrastructure projects, including power plants, bridges, 2,800 kilometers of railways, 20,000 
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kilometers of roads, 100 schools, 50 hospitals and 100,000 houses (He, 2018). Much of this financing 
has been paid for in kind, by Angolan oil exports (now known as the “Angolan model”, where 
infrastructure packages are paid for by resource deals). Detailed award-winning journalism published 
in the Financial Times documents how China’s Queensway Group skillfully nurtured its links with 
leading Angolan political and business figures, cutting deals via backhanders to high-level insiders, 
to obtain a significant share of Angola’s oil reserves (Burgis, 2014). The Angolan model which was 
to emerge from Queensway’s early interventions was facilitated by an unaccountable authoritarian 
regime and involved questionable business practices which allowed insider political elites, in both 
China and Angola, to enrich themselves via secretive deals. In open, transparent and rule-based 
societies, these oil for infrastructure deals, would likely never have been completed.  Subsequently, 
the Queensway Group has been active in a range of other poorly governed African countries (Guinea, 
Mozambique, Zimababwe), using identical tactics (developing and exploiting close relationships with 
unaccountable political elites) to those employed in Angola (Burgis, 2014). The BRI has provided 
the necessary financial support and legitimacy to Chinese investors like Queensway (for example, 
the group invited Angola’s leaders to meetings in Beijing with China’s vice president, Zeng Peiyan), 
required to grease the wheels of corrupt officials in unaccountable regimes, subject to judicial voids. 
Political legitimacy and close state to state relations have been important to groups like Queensway, 
now considered a specialist in working in these types of business environments. Queensway is 
privately controlled but has received high-level government support in China. By contrast, western 
developed market MNEs hoping to engage in foreign corrupt business cannot expect their home 
governments to support them. For example, Swedish network equipment giant Ericsson recently 
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agreed to pay over $1 billion in fines to US regulators after pleading guilty to bribing government 
officials in multiple countries over a 17-year period.2  
We argue the BRI may moderate the impact of institutional weakness on Chinese FDI. Firstly, 
it supports investments in particular areas – construction and infrastructure development – which may 
be easier to complete in institutionally weak environments. It provides ample financing mechanisms 
through Chinese development banks to support these projects. It is prepared, moreover, to work with 
authoritarian political systems. Secondly, via stronger interstate relationships, investments risks (and 
perceptions of those risks) in FDI projects are reduced. Chinese FDI has historically been attracted 
to institutionally weak countries - owing to “special” ownership advantages. BRI positively 
moderates this tendency owing to the stronger state to state relations it may foster (enhancing CMNE 
bargaining positions), increased financial resources and lower perceived and actual risk it creates for 
investing businesses. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Host country formal engagement in the BRI positively moderates the impact 
of institutional fragility on Chinese FDI inflows. 
 
What are the impacts of the BRI when accompanied by explicit outward FDI promotion? The 
further moderating impact of China’s overseas Special Economic Zones 
The BRI is one of the most ambitious foreign policies ever launched. It consists, however, of 
a number of associated policy measures although owing to the opaque nature of BRI it is not exactly 
clear which measures are associated with the BRI and which ones are not. As noted, ‘the vagueness 
of the BRI program leads to difficulties in quantitatively evaluating its economic impact’ (Zhai, 2018: 
85). Hillman (2018), notes, for example, ‘BRI is more a brand than a master plan with specific criteria 
                                                          




for project inclusion’ (p. 5). For example, it is allegedly integrated with the establishment of 
multilateral development banks (particularly the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, AIIB) and 
cross-regional economic cooperation programs (Clarke, 2018).  
From the point of view of understanding CMNE OFDI, however, a key plank of the BRI 
initiative, and one specifically related to promoting FDI (as opposed to infrastructure development), 
has been the addition of overseas SEZs. It has been noted, for example, that ‘SEZ development has 
been adopted energetically at the heart of the BRI…to provide Chinese companies (and executives) 
with a controlled channel for building familiarity with and exposure to international markets and the 
global economy’ (Fei, 2017: 840). According to MOFCOM (2015), the BRI is not only ‘taking 
advantage of international transport routes, relying on core cities along the Belt and Road’ (p. 839) it 
is also ‘using key economic industrial parks as cooperation platforms’ (State Council, 2015, 
highlights added by the author, quoted in Fei, 2017: 839). As of 2015, 77 of 118 Chinese overseas 
SEZs were to be built in BRI partner countries (MOFCOM, 2015). 
The creation of overseas SEZs have the expressed purpose of improving the institutional 
environment for CMNE foreign investments, primarily in manufacturing, through ‘filling information 
gaps and reducing risks and high transaction costs’ (Brautigam & Tang, 2012: 800). They are also 
meant to be mutually beneficial; in exchange for furthering Chinese strategic objectives, China is 
willing to transfer some of its own economic success to other developing countries (Brautigam & 
Tang, 2014). For example, the SEZ created by China jointly with the Egypt government in Suez 
reduces red-tape and other institutional costs through a “one-stop-shop” administrative services 
building housed within the complex (El-Gohari & Sutherland, 2010). In several other African and 
Cambodian SEZs, the Chinese government intervened in disputes between host governments and 
Chinese firms (Brautigam & Tang, 2012). Chinese MNEs are also eligible for financial assistance 
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from major national banks such as the China Development Bank, which offers subsidies of up to $61 
million for resource extraction industries and $46 million for others, concessional loans and other 
incentives to eligible companies operating in SEZs within BRI countries (CDB, 2016; cited in Fei, 
2017). 
The zones are intended to help offset the considerable liability of foreignness that CMNEs 
may face, particularly in their initial stages of internationalization. Overseas SEZs provide 
agglomeration benefits to small and medium-sized Chinese MNEs that have limited experience 
working in foreign environments (Brautigam & Tang, 2014). Many of the countries CMNEs are 
attracted to, moreover, may often be poor countries with low labor costs but, in addition, very weak 
institutional environments (i.e. in sub-Saharan Africa). Some of China’s private sector manufacturing 
firms, for example, are looking to exploit lower cost labor (i.e. in Laos, Cambodia, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, etc.) owing to shrinking size (and increasing wages) of China’s working age 
population (i.e. its “demographic dividend” is being lost) (Lin, 2012). Hence, the Chinese government 
has been keen to promote zone development as private sector initiatives. 
An important component of the SEZ strategy relates to its exclusivity in restricting investors 
to Chinese companies alone. By specifically concentrating Chinese businesses together in zones their 
strength in numbers, as a group, can be leveraged. Their group influence, moreover, is ultimately 
underpinned by the Chinese state, which may give host countries food for thought in any attempt to 
take advantage of zone based CMNEs. Host countries, instead of picking-off Chinese companies one 
by one (as China has been able to do to its foreign investors in China – forcing them into unfavorable 
joint ventures, for example, in which technologies can be assimilated), are in a far weaker position to 
negotiate with the economic mass of an entire zone with many affiliated companies supported by 
“China Inc.”. The reasoning is somewhat similar to Duanmu’s (2014) finding that stronger trading 
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relationships weaken the impacts of expropriation risk on CMNEs – because host countries have 
potentially far more to lose when dependency levels are higher. Host countries clearly have a great 
deal to lose by alienating CMNEs based in zones. Zones may therefore provide focal points for state 
to state negotiations (regarding preferential policies, for example). 
Why then might zones also moderate the impact of institutional fragility on Chinese 
investments? It is likely that Chinese zones enhances the bargaining position of the Chinese state (as 
representative of its investors) and, furthermore, that there is greater scope for bargaining in 
institutionally weak environments, where more can be negotiated for (as there are fewer legal 
constraints on what can and cannot be done). There is, moreover, comparatively less concern about 
being held accountable by other non-governmental and civil society interest groups. The avoidance 
of institutionally fragile countries by Western MNEs due to the perceived risk, moreover, provides a 
“blue ocean” for Chinese OFDI. By engaging relatively untapped markets through policy initiatives 
such as the BRI, which provides multilateral infrastructure and cooperation, combined with overseas 
SEZs, which provides additional bilateral support, the Chinese government decreases the investment 
risks associated with these countries and increases their attractiveness for Chinese MNEs.  
Hypothesis 3: Host country formal engagement in the BRI combined with the associated SEZ 




Data and model 
Our model specification is along similar lines to Buckley et al. (2007) albeit we estimate 
models using the annual equity value of FDI projects drawn from commercially sourced FDI flow 
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data. 3  Officially collected, nationally aggregated FDI data from all countries is increasingly 
recognized for its biases (Sutherland et al., 2019). This is driven to a large extent by the bilateral way 
in which FDI is collected. As MNEs often transit FDI via offshore tax havens and financial centers 
these destinations are greatly overstated in conventional FDI data (OECD, 2015). China’s MOFCOM 
data is no exception, with heavy biases towards Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, BVI and, in 
developed markets countries like the Netherlands and Luxembourg (Sutherland & Anderson, 2015).  
Value data are estimated using random effects (following the results of a Hausman test) 
generalized least squares (GLS) models and utilize panel data of FDI flows from China to the rest of 
the world (173 countries) during the time period of 2003-2017.  Estimations are found to be unbiased 
due to the use of both within and between group variation. This lengthy time period helps capture pre 
and post BRI impacts on FDI volumes and moderating effects. Our primary model is defined as: 
 
FDIti = f (β1BRIti, β2Institutional fragilityti, β3Country risk premiumti, β4Cultural proximityti, 
β5Geographic distanceti, β6GDPti, β7GDP growthti, β8Natural resource exportsti, β9Exchange 
rateti, β10Inflationti, β11Open to FDIti, β12AIIB memberti, β13Bilateral trade agreementti, β14Pct 
agree UN voteti)  
 
Where t is time and i is host country. 
 
Dependent variable 
As noted, Chinese outward FDI data is drawn from the commercial databases Thomson ONE 
Banker and the Financial Times fDi Markets. This consists of 2,031 acquisitions and 4,402 greenfield 
investments (totaling 6,433 investments). Of these, 782 were positively identified as SOEs. The 
average investment values for greenfield and acquisition investments are $111 and $161 million, 
                                                          
3 Count data were also estimated as a robustness check. Results were quantitatively similar to value-based models. 
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respectively. We focus on all projects in which Chinese ownership exceeds 10%, following standard 
FDI definitions. Note that our approximation of Chinese FDI does not include intra-company loans 
or reinvested earnings. It can be thought of as an approximation of first entry equity FDI. In reality, 
given the difficulties of using officially recorded FDI data, using commercially available data in this 
way is one of the few realistic ways of gauging CMNE activity (and approximates to the methods 
used by influential think-tanks like the Heritage Foundation’s measurement of Chinese MNE activity).  
 
Independent variables  
Our main independent variables are based around the widely used Political Risk Services Group (PRS) 
institutional stability measures. Disaggregated this includes: control of corruption; political stability; 
rule of law; regulatory quality; and government accountability. A downside of using these 
disaggregated measures is the relatively high level of collinearity between them. We also, therefore, 
create an index based around the average of the five measures (both are used to test hypothesis 2, 
regarding moderating impacts of BRI). We invert our aggregated and decomposed measures. Higher 
scores for institutional risk variables therefore represent higher levels of institutional fragility.  
Two dummy variables are used to capture affiliation to BRI (hypothesis 1) and the overseas 
SEZ policy (hypothesis 3), as reported by MOFCOM.  To test hypothesis 1 we run a model with the 
BRI variable. In addition, we incorporate a number of additional policy initiatives, including AIIB 
relationship, UN voting similarity and bilateral trading relationships, to explore the impacts of other 
measures on Chinese FDI volumes. Some of these initiatives, such as the AIIB, have been associated 
with the BRI initiative, but are in fact only loosely tied to it. The AIIB, for example, was initiated and 
is led by the Chinese government and is self-described as ‘a multilateral development bank with a 
mission to improve social and economic outcomes in Asia’ (AIIB, 2019: 1). The main motivation 
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behind the development of AIIB is for it to be used as ‘an important financial tool for China in 
increasing its geopolitical influence in the region and increasing the international momentum of the 
[BRI] strategy’ (Yu, 2017: 359). But it is not officially part of the BRI. Similarly, trade relationships 
are not included. They thus provide interesting contrasts with the BRI itself.  Other comparators 
included, are non-explicit policies such as UN voting similarity with China, expressed as a percentage.  
To test hypothesis 2 we run models that incorporate the PRS index in our base model 
combined with an interaction term (PRS*BRI). We also test this hypothesis by looking at the 
outcomes for individually decomposed elements of PRS indicators (Table 4). Finally, to test 
hypothesis 3 we incorporate a three-way interaction (BRI*SEZ*PRS) (Table 5).  
 
Control variables 
Control variables are similar to those used in other Chinese location choice studies (Buckley 
et al. 2007). They include: country risk premium (country risk premiums matched to averaged credit 
default swaps spreads and bond ratings – Moody’s and Bloomberg); GDP (World Bank); GDP growth 
(World Bank); natural resource endowment (Fuels, ores, and metals exports as share of GDP – World 
Bank); inflation (inflation rate – World Bank); geographic distance (Distance between capital of host 
country and China – CEPII/World Bank); exchange rate (Host country annual average exchange rate 
against RMB (fixed to dollar) – World Bank); Chinese diaspora (Ohio University); and openness to 
FDI (inward FDI stock as a share of GDP – World Bank). State ownership is defined as a greater than 
50% government ownership (Orbis). See Table 1 for a summary of variables and data sources. 
------------------------------ 







Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix. It is noteworthy that many 
of the PRS elements (control of corruption, political stability, accountability, law, regulatory quality) 
are correlated with each other. Multicollinearity, however, does not bias our results, though it can 
lead to complications in hypothesis testing by inflating standard errors. Beyond the PRS variables, 
multicollinearity is not an issue with regards to other variables in our model (Table 2).  
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 2-3 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Table 3 reports the aggregated institutional fragility measure plus BRI as a dummy, and a 
combined interaction term (BRI*PRS). Model 1 (without the interaction) suggests FDI volumes to 
BRI countries are higher than for non BRI countries (supporting hypothesis 1). However, when 
introducing the interaction term this variable becomes insignificant. This may be because the 
interaction introduces multicollinearity into the model, an issue common in interaction models.   
As regards hypothesis 2, the interaction term itself is positive and significant (5% level), 
supporting the idea that the BRI positively moderates the impact of institutional fragility on inward 
Chinese FDI.  The other policy measures we include in our models (AIIB and bilateral trade 
agreements) do not exhibit this same moderating impact. Based on the aggregated results, Table 4 
further decomposes the PRS institutional fragility measure into its five different components. Table 
4 again (corroborating Table 3) shows that the BRI dummy variable is significant, both in the fully 
specified model (last column) and most of the models reporting PRS components individually. This 
again supports hypothesis 1.   
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Hypothesis 2 predicts that the BRI policy positively moderates the impact of host country 
institutional fragility on FDI volume. The interaction term in Table 3, as noted, is significant and 
positive, suggesting the coefficient on PRS (aggregated) is larger for BRI countries than non-BRI 
countries.  In Table 3 the PRS coefficient on its own is also significant, suggesting that even when 
not explicitly a recipient of the BRI policy, Chinese MNEs are more strongly attracted to 
institutionally fragile countries. Table 4 further decomposes the PRS institutional fragility measure 
into its five main components. Table 4 shows that legal institutional fragility stands out as a positive 
moderator. Accountability is also a significant and positive moderator, albeit the evidence is not quite 
as clear cut. Only in one of the models (last column) is the interaction term significant.  
Hypothesis 3 predicts the BRI policy initiative when combined with the creation of overseas 
SEZs is a fuller and more complete set of BRI policy measures and thus strengthens the moderation 
impacts originally hypothesized. Table 5 reports estimations for our full sample. Table 5 shows that 
the three way interaction of BRI, SEZ and PRS is significant and positive. This implies that a BRI 
partner hosting an SEZ further positively moderates the impact of institutional fragility.  Model 3 in 
Table 5 supports our earlier hypothesis 2, albeit significance is lost in model 4 (possibly owing to 
multicollinearity).  
------------------------------ 




Supplementary tests: endogeneity and the BRI policy 
Do host countries engage in the BRI policy because they have already received significant 
levels of Chinese FDI, rather than the other way around, as we hypothesize? Do governments that are 
prone to entering the BRI also have a stronger likelihood/propensity to attract Chinese FDI? Is there 
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endogeneity or selection problem, in other words? 4  Conceptually, we argue there are strong 
arguments in favor of our hypothesized direction in causality, namely from policy to inward FDI.  
This is because the BRI is intimately connected to China’s foreign policy and its underlying 
geopolitical strategic intentions. Strong political drivers motivate the BRI, which is concerned with 
enhancing China’s foreign influence, via both hard and soft power. In doing so, China hopes to create 
a sphere of political influence around China via engagement in economic development programs 
subsumed under the BRI (and SEZs). Promoting economic interlinkages is certainly one way of 
achieving this target.  Put simply, if current bilateral economic ties are weak, there would appear to 
be stronger political incentives to implement the BRI than in the case of already strong economic ties. 
We believe, therefore, that China’s promotion and endorsement of the BRI in a host country is 
unlikely to be driven by the strength of prior economic linkages or FDI. This reasoning is reflected 
in many of the countries that have entered the BRI, which includes many less developed, low income 
countries (i.e. Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, DRC, Egypt, etc.) with comparatively weak economic ties 
to China – albeit with the potential for considerable expansion.  
Nonetheless, to further empirically explore the possibility of endogeneity, we used an 
instrumental variable (two-stage least square) estimation to explore whether reverse causality is a 
potential issue in our modelling (Baum, 2006). By establishing a suitable instrument, a variable 
correlated with the endogenous variable in question (BRI) but not with the error term, we can run 
endogeneity tests.  One potential instrument is the measure the quality of diplomatic relations between 
China and the host country as measured by the affinity of the two countries’ votes in the United 
Nations (UN) General Assembly. In previous studies, Li et al. (2018) and Duanmu (2014) have used 
the affinity measure of UN votes (based on Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013) in their investigation of the 
                                                          
4 We do lag our variables (by one year). Such lags, however, are an insufficient solution on their own to correct for 
endogeneity and potential biases in coefficient estimates. 
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impact of political ties on Chinese FDI (as a main explanatory variable, however, not as an 
instrument). Using this measure as an instrument, however, may be suitable.  It is correlated with our 
BRI explanatory variable as countries joining the BRI are, in general, likely to share closer political 
ties and likeness to China. According to Li et al. (2018), for example, UN voting similarity:  
“demonstrates the public stance on a large number of issues, including military, security, 
social, political, and economic concerns (Voeten, 2000). Voting at the general assembly does 
not bind countries and thus countries are relatively free to express their sincere opinions 
(Gartzke, 1998). Countries voting similarly are expected to have a good relationship and act 
cooperatively because they share similar views and understanding on world issues (Gartzke, 
1998). Thus affinity of UN votes has been frequently used to capture interstate political 
relations in political science and international strategy”  (Li et al. 2018: 668).  
 
They note that diverse issues, moreover, are discussed at the UN general assembly and that 
voting decisions are not likely ‘to be shaped by corporate interests in a foreign country’ (Li et al. 
2018: 668). Using this measure in their models, they argue, alleviates potential reverse causality to 
some extent. This measure uses two categories of voting data (1 = “yes” or approval for an issue; 2 = 
“no” or disapproval for an issue) and ranges from -1 (least similar interests) to 1 (most similar 
interests).  We use a similar approach. 
To establish whether UN General Assembly voting similarity is a viable instrument and can 
therefore be used to test for endogeneity we undertake several tests.  First, we test whether UN voting 
similarity satisfies the requirements defining an independent variable.  From our first stage 
regressions we find it does have a statistically significant and positive effect on our main measure of 
BRI. We find the F-value of the first stage regression achieves a value of 49.55 (p=0.00) exceeding 
the critical value of the Wald test (5% level) which has a maximum level of 16.38. We then perform 
the Durbin (=1.293, p=0.255) and Wu-Hausman (=1.280, p=0.258) tests of endogeneity. The null 
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hypothesis for these tests is that the variables are exogenous. We cannot reject the null hypothesis 
based upon our results. This implies that the BRI is exogenous of prior Chinese inward FDI.5  
 
DISCUSSION 
Why does the BRI policy positively moderate the impacts of institutional fragility on Chinese FDI? 
We have found, like a number of other studies (Buckley et al. 2007; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012), 
that countries with fragile institutions attract greater volumes of FDI from China. Under the BRI, 
moreover, this affect was found to be even stronger (i.e. that the BRI positively moderates this already 
counter intuitive result).  How might the BRI policy amplify the impact of institutional fragility on 
Chinese FDI? Arguably, one key competitive advantage Chinese businesses exploit is their special 
relationships to governmental and quasi-governmental actors (Yiu, 2011). The Chinese 
developmental state, in other words, has close relationships to both private (and of course) state sector 
businesses (Brautigam & Tang, 2014). This relationship extends from the domestic to international 
arena, where the government has been keen to promote the internationalization of Chinese businesses 
(particularly large groups, i.e. the “national team” business groups) (Sutherland, 2009). Previous 
research, as noted, has established how different measures of bilateral political ties (such as, for 
example, official visits and trade agreements) are leveraged to ease Chinese FDI in foreign markets 
(Duanmu, 2014, Li et al., 2018; Quer et al., 2018). Such linkages reduce expropriation risks, afford 
Chinese firms relevant information and help overcome a range of liabilities of foreignness (Quer, 
2018). Using a similar line of reasoning, we hypothesized that the Chinese state, via its BRI policy, 
may make it easier for CMNEs to do business in weaker institutional environments (i.e. those with 
                                                          
5 In addition, we use the instrument to test for omitted variable bias. Sargan and Basmann tests, with a null hypothesis 




greater fragility). How specifically does the state intervene and what are the mechanisms underlying 
this positive moderation effect in the case of the BRI? To further explore this question, we can 
examine in more detail our results pertaining to institutional fragility and decompose them by their 
various sub-components. Are there any specific institutional factors where the moderation effects can 
be identified and might these results help us better understand how BRI policy interacts and facilitates 
Chinese FDI? Interestingly, our results on the decomposed institutional measures showed that the 
impacts of weaker rule of law and less government accountability (more authoritarian regimes) were 
positively moderated by the BRI policy. Why would the BRI make investments to countries with 
weak accountability and legal systems more attractive or viable?  
One plausible explanation, relates to the aforementioned industrial composition of many BRI 
related FDI projects. Such projects are associated with large-scale infrastructure developments (dams, 
railways, ports, bridges, roads, etc.) (Parente et al., 2019).  These giant construction projects, by their 
nature, are often politically sensitive and typically have long gestation periods prior to 
commencement. Project planning may involve many consultation procedures, for example, as such 
projects typically displace local residents and often entire communities.6 In most instances, such 
projects cannot therefore be easily and quickly rolled out. This is likely to be particularly the case in 
countries with stronger legal and political institutions, where planning procedures are more rigorous.  
The erection of the BRI’s Batang Toru dam in Indonesia, for example, has led to fierce local resistance 
from local NGOs, as it endangers a critically rare species of orangutan threatened with extinction 
(Wilson, 2019). Similarly, Indonesia’s flagship BRI project, a $6 billion high-speed rail project 
linking Jakarta with Bandung (140km away), has run into chronic delays and controversies partly 
over land acquisition disputes (Wilson, 2019). In Kenya, the construction of a $2 billion coal-fired 
                                                          
6 President Obama came into office on the promise of a massive infrastructure programme. This programme ultimately 
was a let-down and failed, however, owing to the challenges of finding viable ‘ready to go’ projects.  
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power station in close proximity to the World Heritage site of Lamu, envisages creation of the largest 
power plant in east Africa. According to the Chinese backer it will ‘solve the power shortage for 
millions in the region’ (Wilson, 2019: 1). However, recent court rulings have halted the development 
on environmental grounds, fearing the massive coal-powered station will destroy the pristine natural 
environment of the region (Wilson, 2019). 
These infrastructure projects, moreover, require very large, long-term investments and thus 
commitments by governments to take on significant long-term debt. In some instances, owing partly 
to poor project appraisal it has been suggested, these have turned out to be unserviceable. Examples 
include multi-billion dollar deep sea ports in Malaysia, Myanmar and Sri Lanka (Crabtree, 2019). 
Negotiating these very large infrastructure deals, however, may be more easily undertaken in the 
context of regimes that are less accountable to democratic processes and therefore sudden removal. 
Parente et al. (2019), for example, outline in detail the important impacts of regime stability on the 
commitment to FDI projects of Chinese MNEs in the Democratic Republic of Congo. These factors 
may also lead to the positive moderation impact of institutional fragility that we observe, specifically 
with regards to accountability. 
Many Chinese infrastructure-based foreign investments involve projects in which domestic 
governments have attempted to push through infrastructure developments and related FDI projects 
with the help of Chinese financial largesse combined with construction expertise. However, many 
have been, to a greater or lesser degree, frustrated by legal and other political pressures, largely driven 
by NGOs and other civil society groups. These examples illustrate why BRI countries with weaker 
legal systems and less accountability may actually suit Chinese BRI related FDI projects. Such 
projects can be more easily initiated and completed in countries with less governmental accountability 
(in part related to democratic institutions, freedom of press, media and internet) and weak legal 
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systems (which otherwise would block heavy handed governmental interference, as in the case of the 
coal-fired power station in Lamu, Kenya).  Powerful institutional forces, therefore, may lead countries 
with weak legal redress and limited accountability to be first in line to receive Chinese BRI related 
projects. Ample financing exists, of course, for Chinese projects in BRI partner countries. The 
challenge many Chinese construction groups face is in finding feasible projects. 
Arguments related to speed of infrastructure development initiation are also supported by 
consideration of the BRI’s multifarious objectives. One of these is the creation of new markets for 
export of Chinese surplus capacity. Implementation of infrastructure development overseas creates 
immediate markets for Chinese products, such as iron and steel, cement, chemicals and a host of other 
building materials (glass, tiles, porcelain, gypsum, etc.) as well as manufactured products like 
machinery and equipment (cranes, bulldozers, tunnel boring equipment, etc.). Clearly, BRI related 
policy-making, and those tasked in undertaking BRI projects, may opt for and emphasize projects 
that can be implemented quickly with a relatively fast turn-around. Again, speed of project initiation 
may be faster in less democratic countries where rule of law and accountability is weaker. 
Chinese FDI projects related to BRI are often tied to Chinese soft loans and aid giving. The 
very significant sums of money invested creates ample opportunities for rent seeking and corruption 
– and in turn for insiders to privately benefit from these development projects (i.e. Queensway in 
Angola) (Burgis, 2014). Such windfall opportunities (for the executives involved) may again be more 
easily exploited in less accountable societies where rule of law is weaker and there is less public 
scrutiny (via, for example, an independent media). Executives, in other words, may be attracted to 
these types of environments when appraising projects. Recently the central inspection team of the 
Chinese Communist Party has assigned members to work with firms undertaking FDI in BRI 
countries, aware of the growth in large-scale corruption that foreign markets provide for Chinese 
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executives - who face much tougher scrutiny at home (Weinland, 2019). The aforementioned case of 
Queensway Group in Angola very much supports the argument that insiders, including senior Chinese 
executives and politicians embedded in SOEs (Queensway’s investments were linked to Sinopec, 
whose chief executive was later charged with corruption), have much to gain personally (in terms of 
private wealth) by working in such environments (Burgis, 2014). In short, these factors, when 
combined, may potentially explain why the BRI policy amplifies the impact of institutional fragility 
on Chinese FDI.   
These findings, of course, can be interpreted in both positive and negative lights. On the one 
hand, for example, they can be interpreted to suggest China’s BRI policy is supporting, intentionally 
or otherwise, unaccountable and less democratic regimes where legal systems are weak – so 
undermining political rights of citizens in the BRI countries. From another, more positive perspective, 
they can be interpreted to show that the BRI policy may help in lowering or mitigating the potential 
liabilities of foreignness and challenges associated with working in what may be institutionally fragile 
and difficult business environments, often low income less developed countries.  In this sense, the 
BRI policy can be interpreted as having more positive impacts on the potential economic development 
of the BRI countries it targets.7 
 
SEZs and the impact of a fuller package of BRI supports   
As noted, SEZs are also considered an integral element and  lie ‘at the heart of the BRI’ (Fei, 
2017: 840). BRI and SEZs are being jointly leveraged as investment platforms for CMNEs (Fei, 2017). 
Firstly, our findings show that SEZs are significantly associated with increased Chinese FDI. This 
suggests SEZs may provide islands of stability in fragile institutional environments. They may, for 
                                                          
7 Albeit we have little way of evaluating what kind of value for money the BRI offers 
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example, potentially lower the liabilities of foreignness that CMNEs face – one of their intended 
purposes. 
We hypothesized that engagement with the SEZ policy would signal stronger commitment to 
the BRI policy, and in turn may foster stronger state to state relationships between China and the host 
country. SEZs, moreover, may also directly leverage the bargaining power of Chinese businesses vis-
à-vis the host country, providing additional support to them in negotiating favorable policies – thus 
attracting greater investment. Within institutionally weak regimes scope for preferential policy 
negotiation may also be greater (i.e. normal rules may be bent) – thus further amplifying the impact 
of institutional fragility on FDI. In countries like Egypt, for example, which created the Suez special 
economic zone, highly preferential policies have been negotiated for members of the Chinese zone 
(approved via a presidential decree). These policies included: no tariffs or taxes of any kind or permits 
and other restrictions on imports of raw materials and capital equipment (allowing the Suez SEZ to 
act as a Chinese import/export processing trade hub); granting of its own customs and taxation 
administration system; prohibition of the nationalization of zone assets or asset sequestration; 
simplified labor and employment laws; and minimal taxes on goods which are exported (El-Gohari 
& Sutherland, 2010; El-Rashidy, 2016). These approved policies were ‘greatly inspired’ by 
regulations developed in China’s domestic Shenzhen SEZ (El-Rashidy, 2016: 85). SEZs may amplify 
the potential for preferential policy negotiation in institutionally weak settings.  More generally, SEZs 
when complemented with other favorable BRI policies (particularly financial supports) may 
potentially lower the liabilities of foreignness and other challenges faced by CMNEs in institutionally 
weak foreign settings. In line with our original hypothesis, we interpret this to suggest that adoption 
of SEZs and BRI in tandem implies a stronger overall commitment to the BRI leading to stronger 
overall moderation impacts.  
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One unexpected modeling result of interest was the finding that the SEZ*PRS interaction was 
negative and significant, albeit only weakly significant (at the 10% level) (Table 5).  This suggests 
that investors in SEZs alone (i.e. not in conjunction with the BRI) behave in a more similar way to 
MNE investors from developed markets. Namely, they do care about institutional fragility. To further 
explore this interesting result, we further decomposed our sample by ownership to explore whether 
the role of China’s private sector may be playing a stronger role in this outcome. Recall that SEZs 
were originally developed in China to attract private investments and businesses more strongly driven 
by market forces. This is also the case for overseas SEZs: while some zones were developed with 
state-owned businesses in mind (the Chambishi zone in Zambia, for example), even these zones were 
designed to include strong private sector participation. In contrast to infrastructure development, 
therefore, SEZs have a stronger focus on private sector investments. The private sector is arguably 
more affected by institutional fragility and the economic and political risks this engenders (because 
it does not have the immediate and direct backing of government). In China, private entrepreneurs 
can be disposed of when they no longer serve a political purpose or serve the “wrong” purpose (Zhang 
et al., 2014). Thus, private entrepreneurs are arguably not as “protected” as state enterprises and are 
may be more exposed to adverse political and social actions in the host market. Decomposing our 
sample by state and private ownership in additional supplementary analysis (see appendices), our 
results did suggest that it was privately owned firms driving this observed, albeit weak, negatively 
significant interaction. 
The BRI appears to be exporting components of the Chinese development model – in line 
with the general ideas associated with the widely debated Beijing consensus. While some aspects of 
this model may be of concern when looked at from a Western, democratic liberal free-market 
perspectives (i.e. such as the Washington Consensus), not all aspects of the development model 
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associated with overseas SEZs are necessarily antithetical to them.  In the SEZs there are more private 
sector focused initiatives and Chinese FDI in these cases may be associated with better institutional 
quality. This also points to a possible duality underlying China’s BRI engagement which requires 
further investigation. Perhaps as the private sector grows in importance these impacts will intensify 
and the role of SEZs as a catalyst for greater private sector market oriented FDI activities will 
intensify, overturning the currently observed relationships. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Using the BRI and associated policies China is arguably diffusing aspects of its own 
development model and experience to other countries, particularly developing economies. The 
Chinese approach to development, however, may favor certain institutional configurations, including 
weak legal institutions and limited accountability. Whether by design or otherwise (i.e. simply by the 
play of market forces), our study shows the influence of BRI appears to have amplified the impacts 
of institutional fragility on promoting Chinese inward FDI to host countries. Looked at from a 
different angle, the BRI policy appears to be supporting the growth, and possible subsequent 
integration with, countries more similar to China itself – namely those that lack fully functioning 
legal systems and high levels of accountability. Viewed from the perspective of liberal, developed 
market democracies, this may appear as a worrisome trend. However, it is important to note that many 
of the countries that have received support from the BRI are exactly those that the West has often 
been unwilling to meaningfully engage with. Through Chinese-led policies, such as the BRI, the 
economic development of these very same countries may be promoted. At one level, this may not 
bode well for the future of a liberal democratic world order (as envisioned, for example, in the original 
post second world war Marshall Plan). The geopolitical vision Chinese leaders have in mind today, 
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arguably, is one in which Western legal, political and economic institutions might be supplanted by 
alternatives more akin to those found in China itself.  Our findings show that Beijing, deliberately or 
otherwise, appears to be promoting less accountable and more autocratic governments not subject to 
inconvenient legal rulings.  
 
Policy Implications 
The Chinese development model the BRI currently promotes involves the downplaying of 
individual human rights and emphasizing, above all else, the paramount gains of economic 
development. Further, it seems the BRI has enhanced the potential for CMNEs to engage in 
corruption. The Chinese government will do well to extend their hard line on domestic corruption to 
the international arena. While there may be downsides in terms of political freedoms, there may, as 
mentioned, also be considerable upsides in terms of economic development, including poverty 
reduction. Without Chinese growth, for example, the world would never have gotten anywhere near 
meeting many of the United Nation’s eight Millennium Development Goals. Chinese (domestic) 
policies have lifted many millions of people out of poverty at home. Externally-focused policies, such 
as the BRI, may have the same poverty-alleviating impact abroad. Further, the BRI’s goal of 
enhancing the volume of Chinese OFDI is working. It is possible the innovative developmental 
policies China has created is relevant to other countries – both developing and emerging. 
Better understanding and acknowledging the impacts of China’s growing global influence, 
whatever one’s moral or ethical standpoint on it, is vitally important if Western policy-makers are to 
successfully engage in shaping the future international geopolitical landscape. International political 
relations between the US and China, for example, are nearing an all-time low as the US embarks upon 
an inward-looking phase. The European Union is struggling to successfully counter Chinese BRI 
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related influence in its own backyard. Better understanding the nature of the BRI policy, including 
its impacts on Chinese FDI and growing economic integration between China and other BRI member 
countries, may help inform high level policy making in the major developed market economies as we 
grow into a post-Washington consensus era of international political and economic engagement. The 
OECD led developed market economies, in particular, must further reflect on how best to engage 
with lower income emerging market economies in the face of an ever more assertive China. 
Looked at from a host country perspective, our findings suggest countries that do engage with 
Chinese BRI policy can potentially attract higher levels of FDI and that this, in turn, could benefit 
their economies. Special economic zones, as a Chinese development tool, may also hold out 
considerable longer-term potential for the attraction of a wide variety of Chinese MNEs, particularly 
from the private sector. Future research would do well to explore the impacts of these zones 
specifically and the BRI more generally. While we have shown they do impact on FDI, better 
understanding other impacts, such as on employment, exports, domestic linkages between Chinese 
and host market firms, as well as economic growth and poverty reduction more generally, is required.  
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Table 1: Variables, descriptions, and data sources. 
Variable Proxy Data source 
Chinese outward FDI Value of Chinese FDI projects in host 
country 
Financial Times fDi 
Markets; Thomson ONE 
Country risk premium Mature equity market premium plus 
additional country risk premium 
Moody’s; Bloomberg 
Cultural proximity Dummy variable where percentage of host 
country population is Chinese is 1% or 
greater = 1; zero otherwise 
Ohio University 
Geographic distance Geographic distance from Beijing to the 
capital of the host country 
CEPII/World Bank 
GDP Host country gross domestic product World Bank 
GDP growth Gross domestic product growth World Bank 
Natural resource exports Fuels, ores, and metals exports as a share of 
GDP 
World Bank 
Exchange rate Host country annual average exchange rate 
against RMB (fixed to dollar) 
World Bank 
Inflation Inflation rate World Bank 
Open to FDI Inward FDI stock as a share of GDP World Bank 
Institutional fragility Index based around the average of five 
institutional fragility factors: control of 
corruption; political stability; rule of law; 
regulatory quality; and government 
accountability 
Political Risk Services 
Group 
SEZ Dummy variable where the host country has 
at least one nationally approved Chinese 
overseas special economic zone = 1; zero 
otherwise 
China Ministry of 
Commerce 
BRI Dummy variable where host country has 
committed to at least one BRI project = 1; 
zero otherwise 
China Ministry of 
Commerce 
AIIB member Dummy variable where AIIB member 
country = 1; zero otherwise 
Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank 
Bilateral trade agreement Dummy variable where having a bilateral 
trade agreement between the host country 
and China = 1; zero otherwise 
China Ministry of 
Commerce 
Pct agree UN vote Percentage of United Nations votes the 
same for the host country and China 
United Nations 




Table 2: Pairwise correlations 
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
  (1) FDI  1.00 
  (2) Corruption  -0.12* 1.00 
  (3) Political instability 0.04 0.02 1.00 
  (4) Legal fragility  -0.06 0.70* 0.11* 1.00 
  (5) Reg. fragility -0.13* 0.79* -0.08* 0.64* 1.00 
  (6) Unaccountability -0.04 0.53* -0.30* 0.29* 0.57* 1.00 
  (7) Risk premium -0.12* 0.65* 0.11* 0.63* 0.61* 0.38* 1.00 
  (8) Cult. proximity 0.15* -0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.15* -0.00 -0.08* 1.00 
  (9) Geo. distance -0.06* 0.11* 0.07* 0.40* 0.17* -0.10* 0.21* -0.11* 1.00 
  (10) GDP 0.44* -0.25* 0.04 -0.19* -0.31* -0.22* -0.25* 0.17* -0.03 1.00 
  (11) GDP growth -0.02 0.16* -0.18* 0.10* 0.19* 0.15* 0.13* 0.04 -0.07* -0.07* 1.00 
  (12) Natural resources 0.00 0.04 0.09* 0.07 0.13* -0.02 0.07* 0.00 0.16* -0.07* 0.07* 1.00 
  (13) Exchng. rate -0.00 0.11* 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.15* -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.08* 0.02 1.00 
  (14) Inflation -0.01 0.13* 0.05 0.14* 0.13* 0.09* 0.17* 0.05 0.05 -0.06* -0.05 0.05 0.12* 1.00 
  (15) Open to FDI -0.01 -0.19* 0.01 -0.16* -0.21* -0.14* -0.09* -0.03 0.09* -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 -0.04 1.00 
  (16) AIIB member 0.19* -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.12* -0.01 0.13* -0.20* 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 1.00 
  (17) Bilat. trade_agree 0.12* -0.15* 0.08* -0.08* -0.16* 0.04 -0.14* 0.31* -0.21* -0.02 0.04 0.09* -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.25* 1.00 
  (18) PCT UN_vote -0.15* 0.58* -0.27* 0.49* 0.60* 0.61* 0.43* -0.00 0.16* -0.37* 0.20* 0.11* 0.02 0.05 -0.13* -0.06* 0.04 1.00 
  (19) BRI 0.11* 0.07* 0.08* 0.02 0.08* 0.11* 0.05 0.03 -0.24* -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.56* 0.13* -0.13* 1.00 
  (20) SEZ 0.13* 0.12* 0.15* 0.17* 0.14* 0.10* 0.07* 0.13* -0.09* 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.00 0.13* -0.02 0.16* 0.18* 0.04 0.12* 1.00 
  (21) Institutional frag. -0.10* 0.89* 0.06 0.79* 0.89* 0.70* 0.71* -0.06 0.20* -0.29* 0.15* 0.08* 0.04 0.16* -0.19* 0.02 -0.09* 0.65* 0.09* 0.17* 1.00 
Mean  








0.06 3.04 0.03 0.07 0.73 0.07 0.03 0.61 
S.D.  1362.7
6 








0.26 32.72 0.17 0.25 0.16 0.25 0.18 0.16 
 
* shows significance at the 0.01 level  
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      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9) 
    FDI value      FDI value FDI value      FDI value FDI value      FDI value FDI value      FDI value FDI value 
Country risk premium -2705.26 -2773.37 -2108.73 -2124.86 -1615.76 -1625.48 -1349.12 -1082.94 -1525.86 
   (3420.42) (3414.01) (3384.93) (3385.09) (3389.01) (3397.21) (3237.80) (3241.31) (3063.11) 
Cultural proximity 253.89 259.72 216.11 213.06 207.00 204.85 360.69** 380.33** 226.65 
   (189.68) (189.20) (186.24) (186.76) (186.56) (187.38) (168.72) (168.93) (158.77) 
Geographic distance -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
GDP 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDP growth -116.15 165.93 -267.45 -284.93 -887.50 -898.90 -465.43 -445.42 475.74 
   (1285.18) (1290.55) (1277.34) (1280.13) (1280.59) (1281.58) (1281.92) (1281.57) (1263.09) 
Natural resource exports 914.74* 888.71* 804.62* 803.97* 756.10 748.83 791.09* 743.72* 542.43 
   (485.41) (484.37) (477.30) (477.07) (474.65) (476.84) (439.28) (439.85) (406.32) 
Exchange rate 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05* 0.05* 0.04 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Inflation 1315.40 1180.54 1232.83 1238.73 1091.77 1082.91 844.63 926.37 1294.95 
   (985.22) (985.83) (978.96) (979.53) (985.09) (986.18) (956.99) (958.69) (934.24) 
Open to FDI 282.97*** 287.46*** 276.55*** 276.20*** 278.72*** 277.59*** 121.23 114.83 69.55 
   (75.63) (75.50) (74.77) (74.78) (74.71) (74.97) (78.53) (78.57) (74.52) 
Institutional fragility 1123.45* 1019.65* 1137.39* 1148.49* 1329.73** 1382.90** 985.03 3250.34 469.03 
   (610.19) (610.84) (600.32) (602.45) (593.08) (604.57) (618.53) (2009.48) (1922.76) 
BRI 952.34*** -922.46       -1591.82 
   (195.84) (925.44)       (985.42) 
BRI#Ins.fragility  4297.36**       5482.65** 
    (2073.34)       (2311.50) 
AIIB member   1441.59*** 1619.67*     2468.74** 
     (275.84) (862.04)     (967.75) 
AIIB member#Ins.frag    -428.33     -3970.06* 
      (1966.20)     (2320.31) 
Bilateral trade agreement     483.27** 701.06   149.63 
       (202.37) (500.83)   (497.97) 
Bilat.trade agree#Ins.frag      -645.70   358.44 
        (1351.06)   (1293.25) 
Pct agree UN vote       -54.77 1264.01 792.10 
         (492.86) (1215.82) (1141.76) 
Pct agree UN vote#Ins.fr.        -3528.23 -584.46 
          (2975.71) (2820.98) 
 cons -529.88** -508.88* -469.46* -470.25* -440.32* -450.67* -277.08 -1084.69 -777.73 
   (263.07) (262.58) (257.44) (257.36) (253.71) (255.37) (336.43) (760.39) (709.60) 
 Obs. 1204 1204 1204 1204 1204 1204 1191 1191 1191 
 Pseudo R2  .235 .238 .239 .244 .227 .227 .222 .2214 .z 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Table 4: Institutional fragility decomposed and individually interacted with BRI. 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7) 
       fdi_all_val    fdi_all_val    fdi_all_val    fdi_all_val    fdi_all_val    fdi_all_val    fdi_all_val 
Country risk premium -2093.17 -2491.95 -2039.45 -1536.23 -2034.89 -2029.16 -795.70 
   (3465.87) (3463.23) (3476.30) (3293.07) (3424.32) (3473.58) (3562.75) 
Cultural proximity 229.46 235.83 232.23 235.44 226.62 223.31 189.35 
   (245.89) (243.30) (247.65) (243.83) (243.61) (248.18) (197.59) 
Geographic distance -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
GDP 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDP growth 333.45 509.06 243.94 184.16 289.28 494.27 221.25 
   (961.45) (968.97) (967.75) (930.20) (962.33) (1039.99) (1351.95) 
Natural resource exports 957.31* 915.63* 964.47* 943.47* 957.65* 946.21* 890.90* 
   (515.84) (515.38) (517.59) (513.94) (517.18) (516.78) (501.46) 
Exchange rate 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Inflation 1566.61 1382.61 1562.38 1512.55 1588.98 1541.84 1520.44 
   (1534.07) (1438.88) (1550.18) (1466.44) (1524.45) (1486.60) (1052.84) 
Open to FDI 261.94 268.52 266.07 272.70 260.64 259.52 262.21*** 
   (182.96) (184.91) (183.50) (185.70) (183.43) (184.05) (77.07) 
BRI 868.64** 1691.65** 2180.07 3129.52** 769.57 1191.82 4917.92*** 
   (419.71) (849.68) (2081.70) (1481.32) (560.43) (785.10) (1901.72) 
Corruption -170.21* -184.76** -174.28* -171.97* -170.41* -172.52* -199.01** 
   (91.47) (91.31) (90.79) (91.03) (90.98) (92.49) (98.60) 
Political instability 58.05* 57.88* 55.01* 59.26* 57.91* 56.71* 50.89 
   (32.76) (32.81) (31.74) (32.51) (32.53) (33.13) (38.75) 
Legal fragility 181.16** 185.75** 256.45 146.13* 179.82** 184.20** 140.20 
   (85.29) (85.80) (85.51) (81.06) (85.88) (85.54) (90.27) 
Regulatory fragility 37.89 41.35 38.98 44.81 40.96 44.01 105.43 
   (137.15) (135.32) (137.48) (134.18) (134.79) (135.48) (141.94) 
Unaccountability 112.81** 115.90** 119.90** 123.84** 112.54** 101.11* 95.88 
   (52.05) (51.12) (52.00) (49.83) (51.87) (55.53) (62.64) 
BRI#corruption  341.02     438.63 
    (369.21)     (458.76) 
BRI#political Instability   256.45    155.27 
     (308.36)    (261.17) 
BRI#legal fragility    990.42**   938.64*** 
      (467.74)   (307.12) 
BRI#regulatory fragil.     -45.79  -946.24** 
       (459.25)  (392.71) 
BRI#unaccountability      221.19 341.99** 
        (185.73) (167.30) 
cons 1023.75* 1021.38* 1009.18* 933.44* 1023.37* 989.05* 799.28 
   (557.50) (559.76) (554.60) (559.23) (556.49) (577.05) (504.11) 
Obs. 1181 1181 1181 1181 1181 1181 1181 
R2  .241 .244 .242 .249 .241 .242 .254 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 5: Total FDI regressed on SEZs and BRI combined, including moderation.  
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
    FDI value      FDI 
value 
FDI value      FDI 
value 
 Country risk premium -2950.22 -2969.02 -2912.78 -2507.80 
   (3382.22) (3384.62) (3391.18) (3305.28) 
 Cultural proximity 240.00 245.10 244.97 262.17 
   (185.65) (186.15) (187.18) (180.36) 
 Geographic distance -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 GDP 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDP growth 112.48 313.73 194.04 -572.14 
   (1281.93) (1287.37) (1288.78) (1270.66) 
Natural resource 
exports 
862.36* 847.69* 821.15* 900.00* 
   (476.41) (477.46) (479.94) (464.04) 
 Exchange rate 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 Inflation 1332.25 1224.33 1369.37 1499.19 
   (979.00) (981.17) (985.04) (965.44) 
 Open to FDI 283.00*** 286.56*** 288.46*** 289.91*** 
   (74.60) (74.71) (74.92) (72.84) 
 SEZ 829.21*** 754.58*** 3876.72** 3251.08* 
   (273.05) (276.79) (1865.32) (1832.60) 
 BRI 862.55*** -597.41 -659.41 1345.01 
   (197.52) (930.86) (930.93) (964.93) 
 Institutional fragility 913.35 852.51 933.94 1135.06* 









 SEZ# Institutional 
fragility 






   7353.63*** 
(1123.04) 
cons -487.11* -475.80* -505.40* -487.21* 
   (257.87) (258.58) (260.37) (251.21) 
 Obs. 1204 1204 1204 1204 
 Bet/within R2  .241 .245 .248 .275 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 





Appendix A:  SOE FDI, impacts of SEZs and BRI combined, including moderation.  
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
    fdi_soe_val fdi_soe_val fdi_soe_val fdi_soe_val 
 Country risk premium -2172.60** -2173.47** -2173.40** -2106.84** 
   (908.95) (910.79) (913.07) (905.15) 
 Cultural proximity 141.92*** 142.97*** 142.92*** 144.63*** 
   (46.72) (46.92) (47.14) (46.60) 
 Geographic distance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDP growth -598.40* -562.65 -568.85 -697.43* 
   (361.92) (363.76) (364.60) (363.57) 
Natural resource exports 158.33 156.15 155.28 171.04 
   (122.05) (122.51) (123.11) (121.86) 
 Exchange rate 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 Inflation 129.76 108.54 116.11 145.18 
   (272.50) (273.50) (275.14) (273.23) 
 Open to FDI 15.92 16.53 16.62 16.80 
   (19.82) (19.87) (19.93) (19.75) 
 SEZ 75.25 62.03 212.23 105.61 
   (76.43) (77.58) (525.56) (522.62) 
 BRI 220.27*** -42.51 -45.48 307.90 
   (56.40) (264.64) (264.99) (277.60) 
 Institutional fragility 271.43* 260.35 263.95* 301.57* 
   (157.48) (158.33) (159.31) (158.01) 
 BRI# Ins.fragility  606.00 612.49 -437.24 
    (596.25) (597.01) (648.20) 
 SEZ#Ins.fragility   -288.27 -363.78 
     (997.83) (991.12) 
 BRI#SEZ#Ins fragility    1305.32*** 
      (324.88) 
 cons -37.74 -35.55 -36.82 -35.48 
   (65.41) (65.70) (66.11) (65.38) 
 Obs. 1204 1204 1204 1204 
 Pseudo R2  .063 .0639 .064 .077 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Appendix B:  Private FDI value, impacts of SEZs and BRI combined, including moderation.  
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
    fdi_private_val fdi_private_val fdi_private_val fdi_private_val 
Country risk premium 85.58 116.31 37.10 125.29 
   (1271.06) (1267.70) (1266.10) (1222.21) 
Cultural proximity 27.92 33.12 31.97 35.26 
   (58.23) (58.11) (58.01) (56.00) 
Geographic distance 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDP growth 468.95 622.48 547.36 146.62 
   (571.41) (572.66) (572.70) (554.49) 
Natural resource exports 24.11 12.84 -6.42 61.21 
   (157.75) (157.38) (157.36) (152.07) 
Exchange rate 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Inflation 1014.55** 904.64** 1020.24** 1182.88*** 
   (415.37) (416.22) (418.75) (404.60) 
Open to FDI 17.87 20.76 22.26 21.39 
   (27.54) (27.48) (27.45) (26.49) 
SEZ 741.92*** 685.35*** 2486.33*** 2112.39*** 
   (117.71) (119.23) (816.76) (789.44) 
BRI 471.80*** -650.58 -690.47 571.84 
   (92.01) (422.59) (422.27) (429.26) 
Institutional fragility -200.79 -249.66 -213.05 -76.55 
   (210.42) (210.62) (210.91) (204.12) 
BRI#Institutional 
fragility 
 2593.66*** 2679.91*** -1082.59 
    (953.23) (952.43) (1003.09) 
SEZ#Institutional 
fragility 
  -3456.21** -3821.02** 
     (1550.70) (1497.41) 
BRI#SEZ#Institutional 
fragility 
   4815.40*** 
      (513.36) 
 cons -24.91 -15.28 -27.99 -24.74 
   (82.88) (82.73) (82.79) (79.92) 
 Obs. 1204 1204 1204 1204 
 Pseudo R2  .118 .0123 .1267 .187 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
